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Electronic communications devices intended for government or military applications must be
rigorously evaluated to ensure that they maintain data confidentiality. High-grade information
security evaluations require a detailed analysis of the device’s design, to determine how it achieves
necessary security functions. In practice, such evaluations are labour-intensive and costly, so there
is a strong incentive to find ways to make the process more efficient. In this paper we show how
well-known concepts from graph theory can be applied to a device’s design to optimise
information security evaluations. In particular, we use end-to-end graph traversals to eliminate
components that do not need to be evaluated at all, and minimal cutsets to identify the smallest
group of components that needs to be evaluated in depth.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Electronic communications devices safeguard classified information in government and military
networks. In particular, domain separation devices allow the flow of information between high and
low-security domains to be controlled. Examples of such devices include data diodes, multi-
computer switches, context filters and cryptographic devices.
Before such a device can be deployed, however, it must be carefully evaluated to ensure that it
provides the necessary security functionality. We are particularly interested in ‘high-grade’
information security evaluations, which include a detailed analysis of the device’s design.
International standards already exist for information security evaluations. Two especially
influential standards are the Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (Commission of
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the EC, 1991) and the more recent Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation (Common Criteria, 1999a). However, while these general standards provide helpful
frameworks for managing evaluations, their accompanying methodologies (Commission of the EC,
1993; Common Criteria, 1999b) do not include specific techniques for undertaking evaluations at
high security levels. For instance, the evaluation methodology for the seven-layered Common
Criteria standard (Common Criteria, 1999b) covers the lowest four security levels only.
Lacking detailed technical guidance, evaluators of information security devices intended for
critical applications must therefore take a very conservative approach. In the worst case, this may
involve careful scrutiny of every component within a device, to determine both how it contributes
to the device’s security functionality, if at all, and the security consequences of its failure, if any. In
practice, such evaluations are time-consuming, labour-intensive and costly.
Our goal in this paper, therefore, is to show how the evaluation process can be made more
efficient, by prioritising the components to be studied. In effect, our approach formalises the notion
of a ‘security perimeter’ (Young, 1991). Specifically, we exploit well-known principles from graph
theory to:
• eliminate components that do not need to be evaluated at all, because they do not lie on a critical
information-flow path; and
• choose components for detailed evaluation, based on whether or not they form crucial links
between the high and low-security domains.
The concepts are illustrated through a small case study involving evaluation of a cryptographic
device for potential breaches of (overt) data confidentiality.
2. DEVICE MODEL
We assume a simple generic model of the device being evaluated, consisting merely of a graph of
components linked by connections. The level of detail in the model is not significant. It may be a
block diagram, with only a few components, or an electronic schematic diagram, with dozens of
components. For our purposes we merely view it as a directed graph of nodes and arcs.
The connections may carry, and the components may contain or generate, information. Certain
components may act as information sinks, and others as information sources. Typically the aim of
a security evaluation is to determine what kinds of information can reach sinks in a ‘low-security’
domain from sources in a ‘high-security’ one.
2.1 Information Model
For the purposes of the case study in Section 3 we assume that the information manipulated by
components and connections is categorised as follows.
• A data connection is one that may carry information that is meaningful in the external security
domains. In particular, it may carry classified information. Similarly, a ‘data’ component may
contain or generate information that is meaningful externally.
• A control connection carries information that is meaningful only to the components within the
device being evaluated. Control connections are not usually considered capable of carrying
classified information. Similarly for ‘control’ components.
If a connection or component is capable of manipulating both data and control information, or
if we are unsure what kind of information it handles, then we conservatively classify it to be of
‘data’ type since this is the most worrisome category from a security perspective.
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The information manipulated by connections and components may also be categorised
according to its security level (Committee on NSS, 2003).
• A red connection is one that may carry classified information, i.e., information originating from
a high-security source. Similarly, a ‘red’ component is one which may contain or produce
classified information.
• A black connection carries unclassifed information only, typically originating from the low-
security domain. Similarly, ‘black’ components are those that contain and generate unclassified
information only.
Combinations of red/black and data/control information types are possible. Typically, an
information security evaluator’s primary concern is to trace the flow of red data information. (Red
control information may be of interest during covert channel analyses, as discussed in Section 5.)
Black information is usually considered to be of minor interest only.
2.2 Component Model
We also assume that the components within the device can be categorised according to their effect
on the flow of information. They can be viewed as functions from the information appearing on
their input connections to the information produced on their output connections. Some typical types
of component are as follows. 
• A buffer has an input connection and an output connection. The buffer transfers its input’s
information to its output with no significant alteration (other than the delay induced by passage
through the buffer). Buffers are of relatively little importance during information security
evaluations since they allow red data to pass through without hindrance.
• A switch typically has an input control connection, and both an input and an output data
connection. Information flow from the data input to the data output is determined by the control
input. Switches evaluated in isolation are not usually helpful in determining the flow of red data,
but they are significant because they may divide the overall security argument into a number of
different cases, one for each of the control values.
• A downgrader lowers the security significance of its inputs. Typically it will have a red input
and a black output. Examples include context filters and encryption components. Downgraders
are especially helpful during security evaluations because they may act as sinks for red data, and
may thus prevent it from reaching the low-security domain.
Figure 1: Typical Network Configuration for Cryptographic Devices
Identifying Critical Components During Information Security Evaluations
Journal of Research and Practice in Information Technology, Vol. 37, No. 4, November 2005314
• An upgrader raises the security significance of its inputs. Typically it will have a black input
and a red output. Examples include key and password generators, and decryption components.
Upgraders are important for security evaluations because they may act as sources of red data that
could eventually reach the low-security domain.
Often it will not be immediately obvious into which of these categories a given component
belongs. It is the security evaluator’s task to assign a category to each of the significant components,
as part of the overall security argument.
3. CASE STUDY
In this section we introduce a particular domain-separation device to serve as an illustrative example
for the evaluation techniques presented in Section 4.
3.1 A Cryptographic Device
We consider a prototype ‘cryptographic device’ (Graves, 2003), which encrypts plaintext characters
received from a local computer and sends the resulting encrypted characters to a communications
network. It also decrypts encrypted characters received from the network and forwards the resulting
plaintext characters to the local computer. The device uses one of several different encryption
algorithms, depending on its operating mode. It changes encryption and decryption modes in
response to special control characters received from the computer and network, respectively.
In a typical configuration, as shown in Figure 1, such devices are used in pairs to allow high-
security computers to communicate over a low-security network. Notice that the cryptographic
devices themselves reside in high-security domains. 
The particular device of interest is shown in Figure 2. Its rear panel houses a DC power input
socket, and two RS232 serial data sockets for connecting to the local computer and the network.
The front panel houses a number of switches and indicators, including the power switch and LED.
Figure 2: The Cryptographic Device
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The device can operate in any of four cryptographic modes, including a non-encrypting ‘bypass’
mode. The three ‘mode’ LEDs tell the operator which encryption mode is active, if any.
The device also has an integral self-diagnosis capability, intended to ensure that classified
information is being encrypted correctly. If the device detects a problem with the encryption process
it shuts itself down and illuminates a ‘fault’ LED. From this state the operator can restart the device
by pressing the ‘fault reset’ button. Finally, so that the operator can test the device’s self-diagnosis
feature, a ‘fault insert’ switch is provided to deliberately cause the internal check to fail—activating
the fault insert switch should cause the device to immediately shut down.
3.2 Initial Block Diagram
A block diagram of the cryptographic device is shown in Figure 3. Solid lines represent ‘data’
connections and dashed lines represent ‘control’ connections. Unidirectional connections are shown
with arrows; other connections are assumed to be bidirectional.
The diagram is closely based on one in the device’s technical documentation (Graves, 2003). (It
omits the device’s power circuitry and associated components.) The level of abstraction varies in
the figure. Some of the components shown represent individual electronic components (e.g.,
component I is a single physical switch), whereas others represent entire circuits (e.g., component
G comprises nine logic gates). Similarly, some of the connections represent individual pin-to-pin
Figure 3: Initial Block Diagram of the Cryptographic Device
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wires (e.g., from circuit C to LED J), while others are sets of parallel wires (e.g., the parallel
connection from microprocessor E to circuit G carries an eight-bit byte from an output port on the
microprocessor).
As a starting point, we have assumed here that the components on the device’s periphery, and
their associated connections, are already well understood. For instance, it is reasonable to expect
that a connection to one of the LEDs on the front panel (e.g., component J) consists of an outgoing
‘control’ signal. Similarly, we expect that the RS232-to-TTL converters (e.g., component A)
produce incoming ‘data’ values.
However, we assume that the device’s internal behaviour has yet to be evaluated from a security
perspective. Thus, all internal connections are shown as bidirectional and capable of carrying
classified information, and all internal components are assumed to potentially contain classified
information, until it can be proven otherwise.
3.3 Functionality
In this section we summarise the device’s overall behaviour, as described in its accompanying
documentation (Graves, 2003).
Components A and B in Figure 3 together form the device’s connection to the high-security
computer. They convert between the serial RS232 bit stream and the TTL voltages used within the
device. Importantly, component A is assumed to be a source of red data from the high-security
domain. Similarly, components M and N comprise the connection to the low-security network. In
particular, component M is assumed to be a data sink leading to the low-security domain.
Components I, J, K and L are the switches and indicators on the cryptographic device’s front
panel. Their connections are all assumed to carry red control values, because the components
manipulate simple signals only and because they all reside within the high-security domain.
The device’s behaviour is largely under the control of microprocessor E. Under normal
circumstances, classified information from incoming RS232 converter A is passed to
microprocessor E for encryption. The resulting encrypted information is then sent into data buffer
H, and from there to outgoing RS232 converter M to be forwarded to the low-security domain.
The classified information is encrypted by software within the microprocessor, using one of
three algorithms, depending on the device’s encryption mode. However, in the fourth ‘bypass’ mode
classified information from component A is allowed directly through buffer H to output M without
encryption.
In the opposite direction, unclassified information received by converter N is sent to
microprocessor E for decryption by one of the three algorithms. The result is then forwarded to
buffer F, and from there to the high-security domain via output B. Again, the bypass mode allows
information to flow directly from N to F to B, without decryption. 
The remaining components are all associated with the device’s self-diagnosis capability.
Redundant microprocessor D duplicates all encryption of classified information performed by
microprocessor E. (Ideally this would be done using independently-developed software.) Both
microprocessors send each encrypted character to ‘comparison logic’ circuit G, which produces a
signal indicating whether or not the characters match.
This signal is interpreted by ‘shutdown’ circuit C, which, if a mismatch is detected, tells data
buffer H not to forward information to the low-security domain. In addition, fault insertion switch
L and reset switch I allow the operator to control the self-diagnosis features as described above. (For
clarity we have separated switch L from logic component G, although the device’s detailed
schematic diagram (Graves, 2003) reveals that the switch is actually embedded within the logic
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circuitry.) Finally, the D–C and E–C connections are used to synchronise the microprocessors’
outputs with the shutdown circuitry.
Even at the block-diagram level, the device’s design is complex. Ultimately, however, a high-
grade information security evaluation must proceed down to the level of the device’s schematic
circuit diagram and microprocessor software. Therefore, the practical challenge is how to determine
which parts of the device need to be studied in depth and which can be ignored or treated cursorily.
4. TECHNIQUES FOR IDENTIFYING CRITICAL COMPONENTS
Given a device model such as that in Figure 3, an information security evaluator needs to determine
whether or not information from a ‘red data’ source can reach a data sink in the low-security
domain. Doing so efficiently is aided by having ways of eliminating irrelevant components, and
deciding which is likely to be the most efficient order for evaluating components.
4.1 Eliminating Irrelevant Components
The first thing the evaluator wants to do to simplify the evaluation task is to eliminate components
that do not need to be examined at all. We therefore observe that those components that may have
security significance can be defined as those that lie on an information flow path from a red data
source to a data sink in the low-security domain. This is the largest set of components that the
security evaluator will need to analyse, in the worst case.
In Figure 3, for instance, two possible sources of red data are incoming RS232 converter A, which
is in the high-security domain, and microprocessor E, which acts as an upgrader when decrypting
information. The only sink for information going to the low-security domain is outgoing RS232
converter M. (Switches I and L are sources of red control signals only, so we ignore them for now,
but see the discussion on covert channels in Section 5.) Therefore, we are interested in all components
on paths from components A and E to component M. Relevant paths include the following. (There is
no need to list paths that iterate around the same loop, e.g., D, C, G, D, more than once.)
• A, D, C, G, E, H, M
• A, D, C, H, M
• A, D, G, E, H, M
• A, E, H, M
• E, H, M
The union of the components in these paths then gives us the largest set of potentially security-
critical components: A, C, D, E, G, H and M. These components are shown in Figure 4, with all
other components and their associated connections omitted. Figure 4 thus isolates the security-
critical part of the block diagram in Figure 3.
This simple technique quickly reduces the number of components to be evaluated. In general, it
eliminates the following types of component:
• Components whose outputs cannot reach the low-security domain. In our example buffer F and
RS232 converter B may both potentially receive classified information from microprocessor E,
but they can nevertheless be eliminated because their outputs return to the high-security domain.
(Similarly, LEDs J and K can be eliminated both because they reside within the high-security
domain and because we are assuming that their control-valued inputs are not security-critical.)
• Components whose inputs cannot originate from a red data source. In Figure 3 the only such
component is RS232 converter N, whose sole input comes from the low-security domain.
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4.2 Identifying the Most Critical Components
The evaluator’s job can also be made easier by prioritising the components to be examined in depth.
In particular, we observe that a simple and potentially highly-efficient approach is to adopt the
graph’s minimal cutset as the first group of components to be evaluated. Recall that the cutset of a
graph is a set of nodes whose removal will make the graph disjoint (Provan and Shier, 1996). A
minimal cutset is such a set with the smallest cardinality. (There may be more than one minimal
cutset for a given graph.)
In our application we are interested in cutsets where one partition contains all red data sources
and the other partition contains all data sinks in the low-security domain. This is an attractive
approach because if it can be shown that the components in the minimal cutset achieve security
domain separation, then the evaluation need proceed no further. In many cases, therefore, evaluating
the minimal cutset first will result in evaluation of the smallest possible set of components.
In Figure 4, we want to find a cutset that separates red data sources A and E from low-security
data sink M. In this case there is a unique, singleton minimal cutset consisting of data buffer H. In
other words, if we can show that this single component blocks transmission of red data then the
entire security evaluation is complete.
4.3 Evaluating a Component
The next step is to evaluate the security-critical components in the chosen cutset. The goal is to
show that these components have the necessary security functionality, i.e., that they are all either
downgraders or data sinks. If so, then the evaluation can stop because the device is guaranteed not
Figure 4: Potentially Security-Critical Components
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to send red data to the low-security domain. Otherwise the results of the component evaluations are
inserted back into the diagram and the whole process repeats.
Above we identified buffer H as the first component worthy of close examination. A study of
the cryptographic device’s documentation for the buffer (Graves, 2003) reveals that it is composed
of two parts. The first, a ‘data bypass’ circuit O, forwards characters received either from micro-
processor E or directly from RS232 converter A. It also responds to a signal from microprocessor E
which controls the release of characters, depending on the encryption mode. The second compo-
nent, a ‘shutdown gate’ P, can block the transmission of characters to the low-security domain, as
directed by shutdown circuit C.
Figure 5 shows the block diagram with newly-evaluated components O and P inserted in place
of component H. The previously assumed bidirectional data connection between E and H is now
known to consist of two separate unidirectional connections to component O, one carrying
(potentially red) data and the other carrying a control signal. Similarly, the connection between
components C and H is now known to be a control signal sent by component C.
Continuing the evaluation, we note that the minimal cutset of Figure 5 consists of component P
alone. The device’s schematic diagram (Graves, 2003) reveals that component P is a single tristate
buffer gate with an inverted enable input. It may thus allow data to pass straight through, depending
on the disabling signal from shutdown circuit C. (Notably, since this control signal is an inhibitory
Figure 5: Reevaluated Block Diagram
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one, a failure in circuit C would allow component P to forward potentially classified information to
the low-security domain!)
Therefore, component P alone is insufficient to guarantee security. We can thus remove it from
the graph and connect component O directly to component M. (The C–P control signal is assumed
here not to be capable of carrying red data and can also be eliminated.) 
Reevaluating the resulting graph then gives us a minimal cutset consisting of components E and
O. The device’s detailed schematic shows that data bypass circuit O consists of three logic gates and
acts as a switch (with two data inputs) under the control of microprocessor E. Again, therefore, this
circuit alone is insufficient to guarantee security.
Thus, our final conclusion is that the ultimate responsibility for the flow of information from red
data source A to data sink M rests with the software running on microprocessor E. This program
will therefore need to be subjected to careful scrutiny to ensure that it enables the release of
classified information appropriately. (Relevant information-flow analysis techniques for security
software exist (Avvenuti et al, 2003), but are outside the scope of this paper.)
Pleasingly, this final outcome matches our intuitions about the device’s design. In its three main
encryption modes, microprocessor E is meant to act as a downgrader, effectively stopping the flow
of red data, and thereby establishing the necessary security functionality. In the fourth ‘bypass’
mode, microprocessor E again has responsibility for correctly authorising component O to release
(unencrypted) red data.
Most importantly, with respect to Figure 3, the overall evaluation process did not require us to
examine microprocessor D, circuits F, C and G, or components B, N, I, J, K and L in any depth,
thus saving the security evaluator a considerable amount of work.
4.4 A Generic Security Evaluation Process
Abstracting from the case study above allows us to define a straightforward process for efficiently
structuring high-grade information security evaluations.
1. Begin with a block or circuit diagram of the device and identify all red data sources (i.e., data
sources in the high-security domain, including those within the device itself) and relevant data
sinks (i.e., those leading to the low-security domain).
2. Apply the path-traversal technique from Section 4.1 to eliminate components that do not
connect red data sources to low-security data sinks.
3. Find a minimal cutset, as described in Section 4.2, which partitions the data sources and sinks,
and thus identifies the component(s) to be examined first.
4. Examine each of the components in the chosen cutset:
(a) If all the components in the cutset can be shown to block propagation of red data, then the
device is secure and the evaluation is complete.
(b) Otherwise, substitute the results of the component evaluations back into the diagram, and
return to step 2.
5. DISCUSSION
For the purposes of illustration, we assumed above that ‘control’ information is not of security
relevance, and we thus did not consider ‘red control’ signals in the security argument. This is often
a reasonable assumption in practice. For instance, ‘comparison logic’ circuit G in the cryptographic
device actually has two ‘data’ inputs, from microprocessors D and E, and produces a ‘control’
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output, to ‘shutdown logic’ circuit C (Graves, 2003). Each of the inputs consists of an (encrypted)
eight-bit character, whereas the output consists of a single binary signal only. Therefore, even if the
microprocessors failed to encrypt their outputs, and the inputs to circuit G thus carried classified
information, there is still comparatively little information flow through the circuit. 
Nevertheless, the assumption that control signals are of no interest is not necessarily true in the
field of covert channel analysis (Bishop, 2003). One of the goals of covert channel analyses is to
determine whether or not information can be conveyed in ways unintended by the device’s designer,
including via ‘control’ signals. Fortunately, the techniques we described above can be readily
adapted to covert channel analyses, simply by treating ‘control’ connections to be as important as
‘data’ ones. For instance, in a covert channel scenario, switches I and L would both be treated as red
information sources, modelling the (highly unlikely!) situation where classified information is
leaked to the low-security domain via the pattern of operation of these switches. For example,
someone in the low-security network could conceivably detect the interruption to the flow of
characters caused by the operator flicking the ‘fault insert’ switch.
Another way in which this work could be extended would be to separate the analysis into
different cases for different operating modes of the device. Certain components and connections
could be included or excluded depending on whether or not they are expected to be active in certain
modes. For devices with a number of distinct modes, this would make the overall evaluation clearer
and easier because the evaluator would need to consider information flow in only one situation at a
time.
6. CONCLUSION
High-grade information security evaluations are difficult and expensive. We have shown how the
process can be made more efficient by applying simple, well-known graph analysis techniques to
both eliminate components that do not need to be evaluated at all, and to choose those components
whose evaluation is most likely to lead to the quickest outcome. In the case study, over half of the
device’s components were eliminated from consideration, without the need to gain a detailed
understanding of their function at all.
Importantly, the techniques for eliminating and prioritising components in Sections 4.1 and 4.2
are readily automatable. Indeed, we have already developed a prototype tool that allows device
diagrams to be entered graphically and then applies the techniques described above to highlight
those components worthy of evaluation.
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